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Abstract
This article’s aim is an analysis of the status of Polish veterans of the Great War 
in interwar period. Their position is discussed in a European context. The author 
underlines dichotomy between ex-servicemen from former Austro-Hungarian, 
German or Russian armies (constituting vast majority of the veterans in the Second 
Republic of Poland) and the ‘independence fighters’ (i.e. soldiers from the voluntary 
Polish formations like Legiony Polskie) in terms of their legal status and symbolic 
position. State privileged the group of former Piłsudski’s Legionnaires and other 
‘independence fighters’. At the same time the majority of ‘ordinary’ veterans was 
offered little more than ‘compassion’. Unlike in Germany or France, First World 
War veterans did not form any important mass movement. The dominant position 
of the relatively small group of ‘Polish soldiers’ over masses of ‘soldiers-Poles’, 
similar to the position of former Czechoslovak legionaries, can be therefore treated 
as specific to the new states of East Central and Southeast Europe.
Keywords: war veterans, First World War, II Republic of Poland, Polish Legions, 
Czechoslovak Legions
I 
INTRODUCTION
Sixty-five million males from Europe, the Americas, Australia, Africa, 
as well as Turkey, India, and Japan, were drafted between 1914 and 
19181: roughly, the population of the entire Germany, from Metz up 
to Memel, at the moment the Great War broke out. Of those, ten 
1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 19882), 272, as quoted in Ian F. 
Beckett, The Great War, 1914–1918 (Harlow, 20072), 282.
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million were killed in warfare; others would die afterwards, adding 
to the death toll because of their inflicted wounds and contracted 
diseases. Once the fighting was over, those who survived could sooner 
or later finally return home and resume their everyday routines. But, 
could they, really? The latter occurred much more complex than it 
might have seemed. Upon those who formerly were the poilus, 
Tommies, or Kaczmareks (so were called in the German army the 
soldiers from Polish-speaking provinces), not only their individual 
problems, and the consequences of war wounds and traumas fell, but 
also the effects of post-war economic and social crises: the unemploy-
ment and impoverishment. Their war experiences and their usually 
tough return to the civilian life became the foundation upon which 
numerous associations of former soldiers were set up. Their numer-
ical strength, purposes, interests, power and significance varied by 
country and its political realities; still, in terms of the European scale, 
mass associations of veterans formed a distinguishing mark of the 
interwar years.
The perspective of the countries and (their) veterans – or, as those 
concerned saw it, of the veterans and (their respective) countries 
– is therefore, potentially, one important perception of the period 
1918–39. The latter, ‘reverse’, sequence is quite telling, since the 
former combatants treated their participation in the First World War 
warfare in terms of a generational experience, the one that rendered 
their own generation distinct from the others; thence, they considered 
it the sufficient grounds for them to exercise authority and enjoy 
respect. Roman Starzyński2, former Polish Legionnaire and Director 
of the Polish Radio, affiliated with the Sanacja camp, expressed this 
view in a rather explicit manner in 1937, eighteen months before 
another World War broke out:
Our generation would never complain of boredom. We have been through 
a great war, joined a series of revolutions and upheavals, survived politi-
cal and economic crises; there is a lot that we have seen, and learned, 
indeed. We have been named in Europe the ‘Ex-Combatant’ generation, 
and considered, owing to the merits we have gained for our countries, as 
holding the right to make decisions with respect to them. No wonder, this 
2 Roman was a brother of Stefan Starzyński, Lord Mayor of Warsaw and 
the  Civil Commissioner of the city during the September 1939 Nazi attack 
on Warsaw.
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generation now wields power in Italy, as well as in Poland, or Germany; it 
claims authority in France …3
Quite interestingly for us, Starzyński, once a soldier with First Brigade 
of the Polish Legions, referred to a common generational experience 
which, in his perception, was shared by most of the Europeans who 
before then fought in the war, himself included. It might have seemed 
that the Polish experience, along with those of the other countries that 
rose in 1918 from the ruins of the old world – such as Czechoslova-
kia and the Baltic countries – would have turned completely different, 
unfitting the situation of the western or southern Europe. None of 
those countries was a party to the war, all ended up as its beneficiar-
ies, in one way of another. So, has there been a common experience 
of the ‘war veteran generation’ extending to all Europeans, or rather, 
there was a dominant narration told from the Western perspective 
versus the dispersed experiences of the Eastern Europe which pursued 
its own, ‘peculiar paths’? Can one refer (and, if yes, on what a level) 
to the histories of former Polish Great-War soldiers as ones that have 
taken a different course than those of the other European soldiers? 
I will take Czechoslovakia as a point of reference – the country whose 
case was similar to Poland’s but different from it in terms of the 
political context: more authoritarian in Poland, whilst more demo-
cratic in Czechoslovakia.
II 
A ‘NEW EUROPE’ AND HER VETERANS:  
THE DISPARATE PATHS
War, especially a total war – and such was the 1914–18 conflict – is 
a democratic occurrence, in the most rudimentary meaning: it namely 
affects everybody, and especially, every fighting soldier, regardless of 
where he comes from, or what his background is. In parallel, the scale 
of (potential) experience of the affected individuals appears extremely 
wide and diverse. Individuals experiences of the soldiers within an 
army and even within a formation may prove extremely different 
from one another. All the same, when it comes to the shaping of 
3  Roman Starzyński, Cztery lata w służbie Komendanta. Przeżycia wojenne 
1914–1918 (Warsaw, 2012 [1937]), 27.
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group or collective projections or concepts, a uniform vision of the 
past tends to emerge. And it was no different with the First World 
War: the warfare was carried out on three continents, but it was 
the image of the Western Front, a several-hundred-kilometre-long 
section in Belgium and in the north of France, that has dominated 
the wartime narratives in historiography, in fiction works, motion 
pictures, museology, and the like. The idea of trench (or positional) 
warfare, the model examples being Ypres or Verdun, proved to be so 
pervasive that even those of the military who spent the entire time 
in the east of Europe, where the war seems to have been somewhat 
different, began sharing it when the war was still on. Eugeniusz de 
Henning-Michaelis, a Polish general in the Russian service, thus 
described the ‘contemporary war’ (which was still on then, in 1917) 
to the Polish leader:
the tremendous armies are lying buried [i.e. entrenched] one opposite the 
other, inert, apparently; months and months are passing without a battle, 
labours taut and tense are buzzing in the rear. … [The soldiers] in the 
trenches are living, fighting, and dying; but any symptoms of life are only 
existing beneath the earth’s level; anything that attempts to be living above 
it, is eradicated unwaveringly.4
Henning-Michaelis never joined the Western Front, and knew its 
conditions from press or literary accounts. And yet, his image of the 
war is closer to that portrayed by the novelists Ernst Jünger or Robert 
Graves than to what his soldiers encountered, for instance, during the 
Brusilov Offensive in 1916. Although trenches, machine guns, gas, 
artillery preparation, etc. were all known, clearly enough, to the Eastern 
Front, the warfare there was incomparably more focused on manoeu-
vring: the fronts were longer and more mobile, less entrenched and, to 
a considerable extent, dependent upon the rear-to-front supply system.
Our idea of the Great War is still, prevalently, very close to General 
Henning-Michaelis’s portrayal. Neither Poland nor a few other East 
European countries have developed their own wartime experiences 
narrative(s) that would now be part of the European cultural canon. 
Probably the only exception to the rule is the peripeteia of the Good 
4 Eugeniusz de Henning-Michaelis, Duch i technika (Odczyt wygłoszony dnia 
26 czerwca w Kijowie, urządzony staraniem towarzystwa polskiej wiedzy wojskowej) 
(Kiev and Warsaw, 1917), 16, 18.
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Soldier Švejk of the novel by Jaroslav Hašek – the flagship of local 
First World War-related peculiar path. Apart from Mr Švejk, however, 
the war of 1914–18 is far from being as well represented in the local 
historiography, or public memory. Contrary to many other countries, 
there are almost no monuments in the present Polish territory that 
would commemorate the killed soldiers (save for the former German 
monuments and Austro-Hungarian war cemeteries in former Galicia); 
it might even be inferred that Poles were not concerned by the conflict, 
and that a ‘real war’ was taking place somewhere else .5
Hence, there comes the question of what, actually, made Poland, or 
Eastern Europe, unique in this particular respect. There is presumably 
a twofold (if not a more complex) explanation. First, the structural 
discrepancies between the societies in the western and eastern Europe 
should be taken into account. While the Western Front was formed, 
as a general rule, of urbanites and workers with a background of 
at least several grades of primary education, many of those joining 
the Eastern Front were superficially educated, or merely uneducated, 
peasants. Most soldiers in the West could hear commands issued in 
their native tongues, whereas a considerable group of those fighting 
for the Tsar or the Emperor had to function within the language 
they had a poor command of, or did not regard their own.6 Although 
a definite majority of war veterans living in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were members of no-more-existing armies, the very strong represen-
tation of Poles (an estimated 2 million7 to 3.2 million8) as well as 
5 Recent historiography tries to overcome that stereotypical image. See Remem-
brance and Solidarity. Studies in 20th century European history 2 (March 2014) – whole 
issue dedicated to the First World War and its memory predominantly in Central-
Eastern Europe; Jenseits des Schützengrabens. Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung­
Wahrnehmung­Kontext, eds. Bernhard Bachinger and Wolfram Dornik (Innsbruck, 
2013); Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny, Nasza wojna, vol. 1: Imperia 
(Warsaw, 2014). The title of the latter book (nasza wojna means our war) devoted 
to the history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the First World War is 
itself a provocation against the image of not-our-war.
6 The Armeeslavisch phenomenon would probably have been impossible in the 
British or French army. As a side remark, the dispute over the military command 
language occurred in the Belgian army, where commands were issued in French 
while most soldiers were Flemish.
7 Stefan Kieniewicz, Historia Polski 1795–1918 (Warsaw, 1987), 549.
8 Eligiusz Kozłowski and Mieczysław Wrzosek, Dzieje oręża polskiego 1794–1938, 
(Warsaw, 1973), 348–9.
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Czechs and Slovaks (1.3–1.4 million)9 wearing the Austrian, Russian 
or German army uniforms would have not, by themselves, translate 
into a powerful post-war narrative. Many of those men did not have 
enough of ‘cultural capital’ (as we would put it today) to be able to 
forge their experiences into a narration that could have had a lasting 
bearing on the collective image(s) of the war. Moreover, the political 
situation – the other factor that may make the difference between the 
two parts of Europe – was not favourable in this respect. The countries 
of ‘new Europe’ emerged thanks to the First World War, albeit their 
coming to the stage is not what the war was about. The new states 
were built on the ruins of the former order and dissociated themselves 
from it, which was an inherent part of their policy – at least in the 
ideological sphere. Thus, the discourse unfolded around the notion 
of a ‘revolution’ or ‘upheaval’ of the year 1918; symbolic funerals of 
Austria were held, with symbols of its reign being put into the coffin10; 
buildings epitomising (from the standpoint of the new authorities) the 
bygone regimes were demolished: such was the case of St. Alexander 
Nevsky sobor and a dozen-or-so other Orthodox churches in Warsaw, 
Bismarck’s towers, Prague column of Our Lady, or monuments of 
Emperor Joseph II. ‘Restored independence’ and ‘foreign revolution’ 
– i.e. the activities of Czechoslovak politicians and military formations 
in the Entente countries – became the dominant narrative lines after 
1918 in Poland and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Stories on the war 
were mainly based on the history of the several dozen thousands of 
soldiers who, within their national formations (Polish or Czechoslo-
vak legions), at the side of the powers’ armies, struggled for their 
own country, as well as the history of their political leaders, owing 
to whose endeavours the state appeared. Feted and commemorated 
were soldiers of national formations and the fighting waged after 
1918 by the new states, which Winston Churchill called, somewhat 
disparagingly, ‘the wars of the pigmies’: Poland, namely, had its wars 
for the frontiers, the risings and, in particular, the Polish-Soviet War; 
9 Ivan Šedivý, Češi, české země a velká válka 1914–1918 (Prague, 2001), 20. For 
an interesting breakdown of demographic changes in 1914–18, see the Czech 
Statistical Office’s official website (only with respect to the Bohemian Crown lands, 
without Slovakia; cf. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2005edicniplan.nsf/p/4016-05 
[05.05.2014]).
10 See Andrzej Zięba and Wojciech Rojek, Stan świadomości narodowej Polaków 
w przededniu niepodległości (Cracow, 2009), ill. 223.
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Czechoslovakia, at a smaller scale, fought against the Hungarians (of 
the Hungarian Soviet Republic and were engaged against the Poles 
in Cieszyn Silesia. The newly-emerged states had no real interest in 
identifying themselves, in any way whatsoever, with the parties to the 
1914–18 conflict; ideological dissention against them could basically 
be profitable since the no-more-existent opponents: the Habsburgs, 
the imperial Reich or the tsarist Russia, could be burdened with the 
wartime destruction, wounds, and resentments .
In-depth analysis of both arguments indicates that the social factor 
was of lesser relevance than the political factor. The former argument 
weakens when referred to the facts and specific details of the Polish, 
or Czechoslovak, case: whilst the Russian or Austro-Hungarian army 
consisted of peasants to much a larger degree than the French or 
English army, the Czech lands were urbanised and industrialised to 
no lesser an extent than the urban regions of France or Italy. Again, 
a definite majority of Poles in the German army (their overwhelming 
majority having graduated from a school) fought with the Western, 
rather than Eastern, Front.11 The differences between the ‘national 
and urbanised’ army of Western Europe and the ‘imperial and peasant’ 
army of the East are undisputed; yet, the peculiarity of the Polish 
and the Czech case is such that they elude such simple dichotomic 
divisions. This issue is worthy of separate analysis. On a tentative 
basis, it may be assumed that in terms of social structure Polish and 
Czechoslovak First World War soldiers formed part of the patchy, or 
heterogeneous landscape of European armies that embraced members 
of all the social classes.
The political argument gains, in turn, in relevance under the 
assumption that veterans form a group whose existence is based not 
solely on the individual experience of fighting and individual memory 
of it, but primarily on the relationship with an organised community 
of comrades-in-arms and with the state, as an institution which is 
to add meaning to such experience. The state ought to confirm the 
importance of veterans, emphasise their merits, and reward them in 
both symbolical and material terms. As far as Poland and Czecho-
slovakia are concerned, the situation after 1918 was such that the 
war-waging states had disappeared and in lieu of them there appeared 
11 See Ryszard Kaczmarek, Polacy w armii Kajzera na frontach I wojny światowej 
(Cracow, 2014), esp. 315–90.
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countries not much willing to have to do with the war – but amongst 
their citizens was a multitude of former soldiers of alien armies. Both 
countries had to somehow determine their relationship with their 
respective veteran communities (and, vice versa).
This rather paradoxical situation was, in fact, constitutive to the 
distinctive character of the Polish and Czechoslovak case. Many other 
countries, after the post-war shifts of borders, were home to those 
who not long before then fought against these countries. The Alsa-
tians in France, the Hungarian soldiers from Transylvania in Romania, 
the Austrian soldiers from Tirol in north-eastern Italy, and more than 
a half of the citizens of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croatians and 
Slovenes, who until 1918 had been subjects of the Habsburgs. In 
each of these cases, the ex-combatant question was among the many 
elements of a wider issue – namely, integration of the newly-annexed 
territories with the rest of the country (unification of the legal system, 
economic, social and symbolical integration, etc.). In none of them 
was the country being party to the war completely replaced by a new 
state entity that would determine its stance with respect to the war 
somewhat on an ex-post basis.
12
Table 1. Potential categories of veteran–state relations in post-war Europe.
Veterans ‘Old’ country ‘New’ country
‘Our men’ United Kingdom, Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria 
Ireland(?), Finland,
Baltic countries(?)12
‘Our’ vs. ‘alien’ men France, Italy, Romania, 
Belgium
Kingdom of SHS/
Yugoslavia
‘Not our men’ Russia/USSR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia
First developed before the war ended, the relationship between for-
mer-order countries and former soldiers was for the most part based, 
mainly in Germany and Austria, on aid-providing and commemorative 
12 Situation in all states in that position is disputable. For example in Ireland 
it has evolved from public distancing from the First World War as British and 
imperial war in the Free Irish State in 1920s and 1930s to its gradual acceptance 
and incorporation into public remembrance since 1940s. See Mandy Tonwnsley, 
‘”Neither for King, nor Empire”: Irish Rememberance of the Great War in the 
1920s’ Remembrance and Solidarity. Studies in 20th century European history 2 (March 
2014), 147-72. 
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actions, including interim pensions and collections, the idea of lodges 
for the disabled, decoration and (particularly, Austrian) cemetery 
policy. This relationship was broken in the lands of what was to 
become Poland and Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1918, whereas 
the newly-emerging states had to create, anew and in their own way, 
the relations and relationships with the ex-combatant communities. 
It is from this perspective that the situation of veterans was unique 
in both countries, for the new states were (or were not) taking over 
the obligations and undertook, as it was described by Czechoslovak 
Social Care Minister Lev Winter as “healing the wounds inflicted by 
the war”, to solve the veteran question.
Furthermore, untypical to other societies was the dualism of the 
former-combatant milieu: along with a host of former soldiers of 
the former armies, the much lesser-in-number Legionnaires and 
‘independence fighters’ appeared13: the name described members of 
the formations that were set up at various moments of the war and 
functioned as affiliated to the respective powers’ armies, while retain-
ing their ‘national’ quality. As far as Poland is concerned, this was 
the case of (mainly) Polish Legions and the formations derived from 
them, three Polish Corps in the East, formed after the 1917 February 
Revolution of a group of Polish soldiers in the Russian army, and the 
Blue Army (Błękitna Armia) set up in France. There also were several 
lesser formations, such as the Puławy Legion (Legion Puławski) or 
minor troops in Italy or Finland. As for Czechoslovakia, there were 
the Czechoslovak Legions: French, Italian and Russian (the latter 
being the largest), and some smaller formations preceding them. In 
both cases, the aggregate number of member soldiers was not more 
than 100,000 – this being incomparably less than the veterans of 
the ‘regular’ armies. Although a significant group of ‘independence 
fighters’ or legionnaires joined their troops after serving with the 
Austrian, Russian or German army, usually via captivity or, as with some 
Polish Legionnaires after the July 1917 Oath crisis were dressed into 
Austrian uniforms after their service with the Legions, the difference 
between a ‘legionarz’ or ‘legun’ (colloq., Legionnaire) and a ‘rakuszak’ 
13 ‘Independence fighters’ (resp., ‘independence  adherents’ – Polish, niepod­
ległościowiecs) was a name half-officially used in the Second Republic of Poland to 
denote the members of military, insurgent and conspiratorial formations from the 
period 1905–21.
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(‘Austrian’) was decisive for the main break line as far as the state-
veterans relations are concerned. This division has only partly been 
erased by the experience of formation of the Polish and the Czecho-
slovak army, which – in both cases – consisted in merging the military 
structures and formations remaining of the predecessors with the 
‘national’ troops. However, in the early 1920s, after the armed con-
flicts came to an end, the demobilisation was completed and a system 
offering support to former soldiers has developed, these differences 
became of relevance again. Throughout the two decades between the 
World Wars, there was a certain duality in the policies pursued by 
the Polish and Czechoslovak states with respect to their veterans: the 
Legionnaires and the ‘independence fighters’ were treated in a special 
way, even if this was not quite reflected in the legal system or in the 
official discourse.
III 
WHO IS A VETERAN?
Apart from the damages it brought about, the war of 1914–8 caused 
more than every third soldier in Europe was affected, in one way or 
another: mutilated, crippled, or wounded; this extended to twenty-
plus million males. Added to these war victims was a not much lesser 
number of widowed and orphaned relatives of those killed. What it 
meant for the post-war state structures was a challenge of creating 
a social and medical system that could have somehow cope with this 
universal social problem of unprecedented magnitude; suffice it to 
remark that the French Disabled Act adopted in 1919 came in lieu of 
a, say, peer deed dating back to 1831.
Such rescaling of the problem implied a major semantic change. 
In the late nineteenth century and several years thereafter, for most 
countries war was a remote reminiscence of the years 1866 and 
1870–1; a ‘veteran’ was associated, at most, with an oldish fancier 
of pipe and beer, a member of some Kriegerverein who would meet 
his mates once in a month to feast and revel, and join the colour 
party on a national holiday, twice or thrice a year (the ruler’s 
holiday, a victory day, or the like), marching to the church and to 
a local monument. Encyclopaedias and dictionaries before 1914 
described ‘veteran’ as, primarily, “old and experienced Roman soldier, 
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particularly, in the late years of the Republic”.14 After the Great War, 
the word and notion returned from Ancient Rome to the present and 
began referring ever since, simply, to former and quite experienced 
soldier; organisations of such veteran soldiers, an encyclopaedic defi-
nition explained, “care about strengthening the spirit and preserving 
the military tradition”.15 This was a direct reference to the post-war 
reality. Most the Great War veterans (sometimes named wojaks in 
Poland – voják in Czech meaning, simply, ‘soldier’), once back from 
the war front, were still young men, aged usually below thirty, some 
of them having been through severe traumas; now, their personal 
sense of merit for their homeland at times faced the hard fact that 
there was no decent place for them when back home. The aura of 
pessimism prevalent in the interwar years, and of disillusionment 
as to human nature, was contagious also to those former soldiers 
and provoked a variety of attitudes: passiveness and retreat (many 
of the soldiers never joined a veteran association); pacifism and all 
shades of political involvement; or, radicalism – in a fascist or com-
munist fashion. A good illustration is Germany, where a few powerful 
rightist organisations (old- and new-style ones, such as, respectively, 
Kyffhäuser or Stahlhelm) functioned until 1933, along with a social-
democratic, Catholic, Jewish, and communist organisation. Mass 
war-veteran organisations all over Europe became ever since one of 
the essential drivers of political life and of mass politics of the ‘new 
model’. Former soldiers marched or paraded in their uniforms along 
city streets, protested or supported, chanted slogans for or against, 
had their MPs elected, and penmen siding with them. They formed the 
main engine and propelling force behind the pacifistic currents (as in 
France), joined and supported paramilitary storming parties or armed 
bands (just to mention the Italian fascists). The radical atmosphere 
of the interwar Europe and the conflicts it produced are explainable, 
among other things, by the stigma impressed by Great War on the 
ex-combatant generation.
14 Ottův naučný slovník. Illustrovaná Encyklopaedie obecných vědomostí, vol. 26 
(Prague, 1907), 623.
15 Masarykův Slovník Naučný. Lidová Encyklopedie všeobecných vědomostí, vol. 7 
(Prague, 1933), 633.
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IV 
WHO IS A POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK VETERAN?
In this respect, it could have seemed that Poland and Czechoslovakia 
functioned, as it were, in a somewhat different space. Proactive 
pacifism, especially in Poland, was characteristic, above all, of intel-
lectuals, many of whom – such as the once-pacifist Józef Wittlin16 – 
would quit this attitude with time, finding that
[pacifism] is presently [in mid-1930s] merely a trend yielding sentimental 
results, and there is no positive force it might offer. In case a war breaks 
out, our pacifists will go to the front. We find pacifistic literature moving, 
but it has not affected our lives.17
Whenever pacifist tones appeared in the discourse of war veterans 
(especially, disabled ex-combatants), the reservation would immedi-
ately be voiced that the home country’s independence and borders 
should always be fought for, if such need ever arises. A similar situ-
ation in this respect appeared in Czechoslovakia. Karel Čapek, who 
personified the democratic and liberal ideals of his country, from 
1936 onwards fought severely for pacifism against Jaroslav Durych, 
a Catholic writer who considered his adversary’s antiwar stance as 
cowardice and ‘morality of the C category’.18 However, in September 
1938 in face of the German aggression of 1st October 1938, both 
authors signed, in concert, the letter of the Association of Czechoslovak 
Writers to the international public opinion, which declared the signa-
tories’ will to “spare no effort in our fight for liberty of our country”.19
16 Marian Stępień, ‘Inwalida pierwszej wojny światowej’, in idem, Wśród emi-
grantów (Cracow, 2007) 165–77.
17 Józef Wittlin, Pisma pośmiertne i inne eseje, ed. Jan Zieliński (Warsaw, 1991), 
145.
18 Category ‘C’ stood for ‘unfit for military service’ As Durych puts it: “Není 
ještě největším hříchem proti českému  jménu Haškův román o Švejkovi. Je ještě 
něco horšího a to je morálka «C», morálka nezpůsobilých, kterou jest náš lid 
přeplněn. Je to taková morálka způsobná, na první pohled lidová a lidumilná a uctivá 
a laskavá …, ale pozor! … Čtu tedy Karla Čapka nikoliv jako spisovatel, nýbrž jako 
vojenský lékař. Poznávám jeho C a bojím se. Bojím se všeho, co je C. Umím si 
představit, co by se stalo, kdyby se morálka C zalíbila povětší části národa. Před 
tím nás zachovej Bůh.” Quoted after Jaroslav Durych, Publicista, ed. Zuzana Fialová 
(Prague, 2001), 297–8.
19 Katya Kocourek, Čechoslovakista Rudolf Medek. Politický životopis (Prague, 
2011), 190–1.
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On the other hand, the fascist movements that were developing 
there were rather weak and had a limited room for action and influ-
ential power on the society. The Národní obec fašistická, established in 
Czechoslovakia in 1926 – albeit run by the legendary Legion general 
Radola Gajda, one of the commanders of the Czechoslovak troops 
in Russia, nicknamed ‘Siberian Lion’, known for his courage and no 
good political sense – never won support above 2 per cent (as in the 
1935 parliamentary election) and mostly functioned on the margins 
of political and legionary life.20 In Poland, on the other hand, fascist 
projects emerged out of the national movement and were fathered by 
‘civilians’ such as Roman Dmowski, with his Camp of Great Poland; 
otherwise – the case of the National Radical Camp – they developed 
thanks to members of the ‘infantile age groups’, as Sebastian Haffner 
named his age-peers21, which was meant to refer to those for whom 
the First World War was a childhood-years fascination, rather than 
personal warfront experience. For the Polish fascists, the first war 
they personally encountered was, if anything, the Polish-Bolshevik 
War of 1920.
With so modest a participation of former soldiers in the ranks 
of fascist and pacifist organisations, where was the rest of them? 
In respect of former soldiers of the partitioning countries’ armies 
(i.e. Austria, Prussia and Russia), the answer is apparently rather 
simple: most of those people were inactive, and they did not form 
a single veteran milieu. The wartime service and the experience and 
skills gained through it helped some of them pursue social, or even 
political, activity in their local environments, when back home. So, 
we can find them in rural cooperatives, communal councils, societies 
and association, or even in the Military Reserve Association. There 
20 It is worth mentioning that the role of Gajda (his real name being Rudolf 
Geidl) and his presumed plan for upheaval in June 1926 has been subject to polemic 
till our day: it is not certain whether the coup was real, or was perhaps the Hrad’s 
illusion, which turned into self-fulfilling prophecy. It was only the accusation of 
leading a fascist upheaval that turned Gajda into a genuine fascist. See Antonín 
Klimek and Petr Hofman, Generál Radola Gajda, vítěz, který prohrál (Prague, 1995).
21 “It is there that the roots [of Nazism] are struck: not in the ‘warfront 
experience’ but in the wartime experience of German schoolboys. … The real Nazi 
generation is formed … of those born within the decade 1900–10, who experienced 
the war as a great spectacle, unharmed by the reality.” Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte 
eines Deutschen. Die Erinnerungen 1914–33 (Stuttgart, 2000).
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were many such who contained their wartime past within the family 
and neighbour circle, though; if they experienced suffering due to 
the war, they usually did it in secrecy.22 If they wrote and published 
memoirs, they mostly exculpated themselves from their service with 
the armies of the once-partitioner countries, emphasising their indi-
vidual patriotic incentives. The trend of ‘deserter and malingerer’ 
reminiscences developed especially in Czechoslovakia23, where the 
authors proposed the attitudes of passive or active resistance of Czech 
soldiers against the ‘Austrian hydra’s’ army served as a model worthy 
of following. In Poland, particularly after 1926, most of the authors of 
published memoirs (such publications being rather scarce, compared 
to those produced by former Legionnaires) referred their military 
service to their belief in the ‘Polish cause’, arguing that they essen-
tially would have clearly been willing to join the Legions. Also popular 
culture solidified this concept and the related images. Dodek na froncie, 
a comedy film from 1936, features as the main character, starred by the 
famous comedian Adolf Dymsza, an Austrian soldier named Wędzonka 
(‘Bacon’) who does not take the war too seriously, but when he strives 
to take a nap when a shelling is on, he asks his officer when he 
could finally expect to be removed to “our Army – the Legions”.24
Among the former soldiers of partitioner armies, the disabled were 
the most active group. For them, banding together, forming unions 
and pursuing activities were one of the ways to ensure independence 
in life. Disabled veteran associations solicited state licences for their 
members to run tobacco-shops, small-scale production businesses, 
and the like. In this respect, there was no major difference between 
the situation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, or France: invalids 
were one of the interest groups which, with a better or worse result, 
endeavoured to meet their targets. The specificity about Poland was, 
however, that victims of the war were categorised by the uniform 
22 As Katarzyna Sierakowska observes, “the unwilling avowal of sufferings 
related to the war among soldiers ensued, on the other hand, from the patriotic 
duty, as they realised it, and on the other, from the binding pattern of masculinity.” 
Eadem, ‘“Niech się nasi bracia, ojcowie i matki dowiedzą …, jakich se to wychowali 
bohaterów.” Cierpienie w relacjach żołnierzy Polaków 1914–1918’, in Zapisy cier-
pienia, ed. Katarzyna Stańczak-Wiślicz (Wroclaw, 2011), 272.
23 Domov za války. Svědectví účastníků, ed. Alois Žipek, 4 vols. (Prague, 1929–30).
24 Dodek na froncie, directed by Michał Waszyński, 1936; http://youtube/_
IHY9tg75pI?list=PLBBE CE92574DAC2D6 [15.12.2014].
Marcin Jarząbek
http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/APH.2015.111.04
97
they actually wore: hence, the classification into ‘Polish’ invalids and 
‘disabled Poles’. As Bolesław Kikiewicz, a physician actively pursuing 
the affairs of the disabled in the interwar years, tersely put it in 1919: 
“The disabled of the Polish Army deserve gratefulness; those of the 
alien armies deserve just compassion.”25
The war veterans who resolved to join any of the official veteran 
organisations (whose number was, as was said, relatively low) became, 
in one way or another, integrated in the political order established in 
their country. In 1928, a Federation of Homeland Defenders’ Associa-
tions (Federacja Polskich Związków Obrońców Ojczyzny, FPZOO) was 
set up in Poland as a roof organisation for all the veteran organisations 
supporting the Sanacja regime. In practice, with use of not thor-
oughly legal or democratic but efficacious measures, the Federation 
managed, by the early 1930s, to subjugate a huge majority of former 
soldiers’ organisations: starting with the Legionnaires and Polish 
Military Organisation (POW) members (who did not quite need being 
subdued), through Silesian Uprising soldiers, the handicapped and 
reservists, and ending with large groups of former soldiers of Blue 
Army, or of the three Polish Corps in the East, who before then were 
associated with the Polish right-wing milieus. As was the case with 
the Opposition parties, veteran organisations that opposed the Federa-
tion – such as Związek Hallerczyków (union of former subordinates 
of General Józef Haller) or Stowarzyszenie Dowborczyków (associa-
tion of former members of General Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki’s 1st Polish 
Corps in Russia;  the organisation used the catchword ‘Glory to the 
Homeland!’) could function legally, albeit their reach and interaction 
strength were restricted by the authorities and discreetly controlled: 
the voivodeship administrations received on a regular basis, from the 
late 1920s on, notifications concerning the activities of former Haller 
men and what Mr Haller was doing, and where. In Czechoslovakia, 
the major associations were formed of local legionnaires. While, 
since 1921, a strong and dominant organisation named Czechoslovak 
Legions Community (Československá obec legionářská, ČsOL) existed, 
there were other former military-men’s organisations functioning: the 
rightist Nezávisla jednota československých legionářů (NJČsL), a Catholic 
Legionnaires’ association (active mostly in Moravia), and more. In 
spite of clearly visible differences and disputes between them, virtually 
25 Bolesław Kikiewicz, ‘Inwalidzi “polscy” a inwalidzi Polacy’, Inwalida, 8 (1919), 1.
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none of these organisations did transgressed the ideological or notional 
spectrum of the Czechoslovak democratic political scene. And, all of 
them, each in its peculiar way, emphasised loyalty toward the state 
and its President-Liberator. Quite obviously, the ČsOL excelled in this 
area, organising ostentatious conventions every few years in Prague 
to express their support for the authorities. Other organisations fully 
identified themselves with the idea of ‘Czechoslovakism’ as well.
V 
THE DISABLED: SHARED PROBLEMS,  
PARALLEL SOLUTIONS
As was the case with all the other countries whose population was 
involved in the war, Poland and Czechoslovakia had to face the effects of 
the First World War, primarily in their social dimension. Therefore, par-
liamentary acts regarding war disabled persons were issued to regulate 
the employment, pensions, and allowances for handicapped veterans. 
The practice of medical assessment of health impairment in percent-
age terms, elaborated in the late period of the war, was quite easily 
adopted in Europe: thus, veterans appeared before boards composed 
of physicians and officials that granted them a health status – primar-
ily, in terms of ability to work. Usually, the threshold of 15 per cent 
impairment was the low limit as from which eligibility for a pension, 
be it symbolic, was identified. The disabled laws extended also to 
preferences in employing the disabled, at least with public (state or 
local-government) offices or enterprises. Other privileges included 
sanatoria (though not satisfactory in terms needs versus availability), 
workplaces for the handicapped, and the like. The issue of persons 
injured by the war was thus contained within the medical and social 
discourse. ‘Former soldier’ was regarded in terms of being a war 
victim, a medical case, and a social problem. Such perspective on 
harm, or wrong, implied a specific egalitarianism in relation to the 
victims: rather than depending on the period served or military rank, 
their benefits were primarily based on health impairment rate.26 
26 It should also be pointed out that, for instance, in Romania the right to 
disability emolument extended to all the disabled ex-soldiers, regardless of the 
army they had been with. Apart from the health condition, the amount claimable 
depended on the military-service rank. See ‘Zaopatrzenie inwalidów i pozostałych’, 
Inwalida, 24–25 (1928), 2.
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This is also visible in the thousands of commemorative plaques 
featuring names of the killed (there being not many such plaques in 
Poland): these names are, in vast majority, ordered not by military 
rank (officers – non-commissioned officers – soldiers) but by keys, 
such as chronological (those killed in 1914, 1915, …), geographical 
(natives of locality X, Y, …), or, simply, sequenced in alphabetic order.
In Poland and in Czechoslovakia alike, the disabled laws mostly 
reproduced a majority of the solutions applied in France and else-
where .27 It was essential that these laws were meant, not without 
dispute, to extend to all the harmed soldiers, regardless of the army 
they had served with. Within such an ‘injury perspective’, all the 
soldiers were supposed to be equal, even though they might have 
only deserved compassion. While the systems offering social support 
to former soldiers showed many similarities, it seems that Czecho-
slovakia managed to make up a more efficient system which was 
somehow friendlier to its ‘consumers’. For the Prague elite, construc-
tion of a social justice state was, after all, a major reason to be proud. 
Although in Tomáš G. Masaryk’s country the minimal benefit was 
vested in veterans whose inability to perform gainful work was 20 per 
cent minimum, the number of those receiving disability (or, widow’s 
pensions) was similar to that in Poland, if not, at times, bigger. As 
of 1927, Czechoslovakia recorded 112,000 disabled persons claiming 
a pension, along with 350,000 members of their families.28 In parallel, 
Poland had 100,000 and 180,000 in the respective categories. Any 
handicapped individual willing to receive state aid in the Second 
Republic had to get registered on his own. Hence, one may refer 
to a ‘grey zone’ of the invalids who remained not covered by the 
state register – which is particularly true for eastern provinces and 
rural areas. Still in the mid-thirties, governmental decrees referred to 
registered and unregistered invalids, the latter missing in any records 
and not subjected to medical examination. The deadline for comple-
tion of the registration of war-disabled persons was postponed in 
both countries several times. Medical boards did not win much trust 
27 The Czechoslovak law: ‘Zákon ze dne 20. února 1920 o požitcích válečných 
poškozenců’, in Sbírka, 142 (1920); the Polish peer law: ‘Act of 18th March 1921 
on protection of war-disabled persons and their families and on benefits vested in 
families of the fallen and dead whose death is in a casual relationship’, in Journal 
of Laws, 32/195 (1921); another such deed was issued in 1932.
28 Deset let Československé republiky, vol. 3 (Prague, 1928), 132.
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or reliability in Poland; as a joke from a calendar for the disabled had 
it: “Any disability … shall be radically removed by so-called Super-
revisory Military-and-Medical Boards for the Handicapped.”29
The assumption that the handicapped are equal in face of det-
riment was undermined in Poland during the Great Depression. 
The authorities, in search of saving options and by cutting public 
expenditure, resolved in 1932 to increase the minimum threshold of 
disability entitling to pension benefits from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. 
However, this only concerned soldiers of former partitioning powers’ 
armies, while ‘independence fighters’ and former Polish Army soldiers 
still claimed pensions when disabled at 15 per cent or above. This is 
how the concept first expressed in 1919 by Kikiewicz was put into 
practice. For the record, it should be added that in the late 1930s, 
with improving economy, the restrictions for the handicapped that 
had served in the alien armies were abolished.
VI 
VICTORS OF NOT-THEIR-WAR
It was not the disabled (in spite of their considerable numerical force) 
that formed a dominant ex-combatant milieu in the re-established 
Poland or in Czechoslovakia. Promoted to a dominant position were 
those who considered themselves the winners of the war – as they 
were feted in their countries as such. These former legionnaires, 
Polish and Czechoslovak ones, perceived the war in rather ambivalent 
terms: they rejected the ideas in the name of which the war had been 
waged but identified themselves with its outcome. This was meant, 
from a post-war perspective, to put the Polish soldiers first: those 
who fought for Poland, although the cause was not theirs. This is 
visible, for example, in one of the many Polish critical reviews of Erich 
Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front – the book that was 
extremely popular in the interwar period, also in Poland (the review 
was published in Federacja, the press organ of the FPZOO):
No Polish poet-of-the-book would be capable of writing a book as if he were 
a Remarque. No Polish story of the fighting in the years 1914–20 sounds 
like the Remarque book. … For, that war was not ours. … We have never 
29 Inwalida. Kalendarz 1924, nakładem Zarządu Głównego Związku Inwalidów 
Wojennych RP (Warsaw, [1923], 60.
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believed in the War – what we believed in was Freedom. … And it was at 
that same time that we marched forward, infatuated with the bridge Polish 
sky. This is exactly why Polish soldiers could perish with a smile on their 
faces, shouting boldly, ‘Long live Poland!’ And this is why German soldiers 
were dying morosely and in silence. None of them could shout, ‘Long live 
Germany!’: none fought for their Germany’s freedom.30
Such an attitude, expressed over and over in the veteran press, 
propagandist addresses, and elsewhere, in a multitude of ways, con-
stituted the foundation upon which the entire veteran explanation of 
the past, and of the present was built. Victory in a war one would not 
identify himself with was well received within the ideological context 
of the restored state: while dissenting from a war disaster, its positive 
results – so perceived from the Polish standpoint – were considered 
‘our own’. The suffering, dismal recollections, complaining about 
war-inflicted wounds, and so on, befitted disabled individuals; ‘Polish 
soldiers’ who saw themselves as victors in this war, could, at most, 
‘perish with a smile on their faces’.31
Yet, the relation between the sense of victory or loss and self-
identification with the war could in different countries or groups 
appear in the form of a combination. Countries such as France, United 
Kingdom, Belgium or Romania had very good reasons to consider 
themselves winners of their war. Italy could be included in this group; 
however, as some territorial claims written down in the London treaty 
of April 1915 has not been fulfilled, Italy considered its participation 
in the war to have been a Pyrrhic victory. Germans, Bulgarians, Turks 
and Hungarians had, otherwise, to digest their awareness of having 
lost in this war, a war they identified themselves with – even if they 
could accuse for the defeat suffered some sinister forces inside or 
outside their own country: be it communists, Jews, Slavs, Romanians 
30 Adam F. Augustynowicz, ‘Żołnierz polski i żołnierz niemiecki w dobie 
ostatniej wojny’, Federacja, 5–6 (1929), 36.
31 It is worth adding that such ‘state-made’ clarification of the role of Polish 
war veterans could remain unaccepted by some veterans, especially those from the 
former partitioning armies. This is pretty well attested by the fact that Remarque’s 
novels were distributed across Poland, selling thousands of copies – whilst Federa­
cja, which published the quoted review, was closed down in 1931 – a mere three 
years from the date the first issue was published – owing to poor response among 
readers. See Marek Jabłonowski, Sen o potędze. Z dziejów ruchu byłych wojskowych 
w II Rzeczypospolitej (1919–1939) (Olsztyn, 1998), 300.
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(in the case of Bulgaria), and so forth. Those who did not take the 
war as theirs could well consider themselves losers as well: such was 
the case with the Ukrainians, whose attempts to build a sovereign 
statehood structure on the ruins of the old order ended up in failure. 
There existed societies which did not identify themselves openly with 
the war as such but considered themselves the winners: apart from 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, let us just mention the Baltic countries 
or Finland. Finally, there were countries such as Yugoslavia where 
two or three such attitudes blended together.
This complicacy of the relations between approaching the War as 
one’s own or not one’s own and the sense of doubt or debacle was even 
reflected in the ‘inter-alliance ex-combatant federation’ – Fédération 
interalliée des Anciens combattants, which comprised organisations from 
the world over. In terms of the assumptions – as reflected in the name 
– the member veterans were to come from Entente countries only, 
but in fact the Federation was joined by veteran organisations from 
countries officially regarded as victorious. Apart from France, the U.S., 
Britain, Portugal, or Belgium, there was Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, 
and Poland: as is known, in the latter, former Polish Legions’ members 
were in the lead – the Legions, in fact, being the formation that fought 
during the war against the Entente.
In this respect, in spite of a sense of uniqueness emerging and rein-
forced amongst Polish veterans, the Polish case was not unique at all. 
The topos of internecine struggle, as expressed in Edward Słoński’s 
wartime poem Ta co nie zginęła (“There’s two inimical retrenchments, 
// Me and you standing there”), was quite pervasive also in the case 
of Yugoslavia, Romania, or, at a smaller scale, Czechoslovakia. Identi-
fication with the war’s outcome, while the war as such was rejected, 
was typical of most of the ‘New Europe’ countries, having emerged, 
after all, on the ruins of the order the war had demolished.
VII 
SUMMARY: POLISH WAR VETERANS FOLLOWING  
A SEPARATE PATH?
In the conclusion of his book about the position of the First World 
War in European cultural history, Jay M. Winter rather unexpect-
edly refers, at some point, to our leading idea of Sonderweg, the 
separate path. He namely finds it, once again, that the conflict of 
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1914–18 killed millions of people, and, “all too often victory had 
a taste of ashes”:
Recalling this aspect of the war also helps to cast further doubt on the 
outmoded idea that Germany went through a special path, a Sonderweg, in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century. As we have now seen, all major com-
batants went through a ‘special’ path, the path of a collective slaughter.32
It would be difficult to oppose this argument: there is no point 
debating the specificity of wartime sufferings and problems of former 
soldiers. When it comes to sheer war experience or human tragedy, 
there are no separate paths for countries or nations: pain, yearning, 
hatred, fear, courage – are virtually all the same. However, when 
looking at the locations of veteran communities in the post-war 
realities of individual countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia have an 
evident specificity to them. Obviously, as is the case with the other 
applications of the ‘separate path’ category, it is key to clearly deter-
mine the elements we expect to consider peculiar, specific, as well as 
the criteria used to compare them against the (possibly) peer phe-
nomena. The developmental specificity of a historical phenomenon 
can only be described in relative terms.
The functioning of the First World War veterans in Poland (and 
in Czechoslovakia) was dissimilar to that in other West European 
countries (such as France, UK, Germany, or Italy). It was moreover 
different from how the ex-soldiers functioned in some other ‘New 
Europe’ countries, mostly in that it was based on the split into 
a milieu of ‘Polish soldiers’ (Legionnaires, Gen. Haller army members, 
etc.) and ‘Poles the soldiers’ of what was the partitioning countries’ 
armies. Such categorisation implied a privileged position of the former 
group, which was expressed symbolically, politically and, at times, 
also in economic favours – such as eased job opportunities. Veterans 
representing the national formations were easily integrating with 
the state ideologies, often becoming their inseparable element – one 
example being the Czech Legionnaires keeping watch in front of all 
residences of the Republic’s President. In parallel, both Poland and 
Czechoslovakia took over a series of Western institutional and legal 
solutions and attitudes as far as various ex-combatant issues were 
32 Jay M. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
Cultural History (Cambridge, 201011), 227.
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concerned. The disabled social care system, the Unknown Soldier 
Tomb and other ways and methods of commemorating, inclusion of 
war veterans in state ceremonies and rituals – all resulted from the 
transfer of Western models to the East. Owing to the diverse political 
contexts, the models or patterns did not work in the same way every-
where. While in the West they would potentially have been applicable 
to each one of the millions of Great War ex-soldiers, elsewhere their 
significance would be limited to the ‘independence fighter’ milieus. In 
its Warsaw version, the Tomb of Unknown Soldier, originally devised 
as commemorating all the soldiers killed during the First World War, 
primarily extended to those fallen in Polish formations’ struggles 
for independent Poland (the Tomb’s plaques specified the names of 
battles and military operations of Polish Legions and Polish Army 
from 1914–21). Although the disabled pensions were commonly 
measured in terms of health impairment, it appeared in moments 
of economic shrinkage that for any support at all to be allocable to 
them, ordinary soldiers had to be found harmed severer than ‘inde-
pendence fighters’. If there was a Polish (or, as a broader concept, 
Central-European) specificity of the situation of the First World War 
veterans, all it was about was the fact that the political context of the 
new states favoured a peculiar transposition: the minority formations 
of veterans associated with the national formations came in lieu of 
what would elsewhere have been mass associations of veterans of the 
country’s own armies. As for Poland and Czechoslovakia, then, one 
can essentially refer – somewhat metaphorically – to two diverse 
generations of ex-combatants, forming a demographic unity. One of 
these generations consisted of those (rather scarce in number, but 
enjoying their privileges) whom Starzyński once aptly described as 
‘merited for the country’, the circumstance which entitled them to 
deciding the country’s fate; these people eventually made their own 
experience part of the state-supported vision of the world. The second 
mentioned generation consisted of a majority of regular soldiers 
for whom the War had become part of their individual biographies 
but who never had an opportunity to build a community of memory 
or interest shared with the others .
trans. Tristan Korecki
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